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1Beneath the tip of the iceBerg: a human factors analysis of general 
aviation accidents in alaska versus the rest of the united states
INTRODUCTION
Considerable effort has been expended over the last 
several decades to improve safety in both military and 
commercial aviation. Even though many people have 
died and millions of dollars in assets have been lost, the 
numbers pale in comparison to those suffered every year 
within general aviation (GA). For example, according to 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), there 
were 1,741 GA accidents in 2003 that resulted in 629 
fatalities (NTSB, 2005). While the numbers may not 
register with some, when considered within the context 
of commercial aviation, the losses suffered annually by 
GA are roughly equivalent to the complete loss of three 
commercial passenger Boeing 727s. 
Why, then, has GA historically received less attention? 
Perhaps it is because flying has become relatively common 
as literally millions of travelers board commercial aircraft 
daily. Not surprising then, when a commercial airliner 
crashes, it instantly becomes headline news, shaking the 
confidence of the flying public. 
In contrast, GA accidents happen virtually every day, 
yet they receive little attention and seldom appear on 
the front page of USA Today. Perhaps this is because 
they happen in isolated places, involving only a couple 
of unfortunate souls at a time. In fact, unless the plane 
crashed into a school, church, or some other public venue, 
it is unlikely that anyone outside the local media, gov-
ernment, or those intimately involved with the accident 
even knew it happened.
Over the last couple of years, general aviation has 
deservedly received increasing attention from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA Flight Plan 2004-2008) 
and other safety professionals. Indeed, several groups 
from the government (e.g., the FAA’s Civil Aerospace 
Medical Institute, National Institute of Occupational 
Safety and Health), private sector (e.g., the Medallion 
Foundation), and universities (e.g., University of Illinois, 
Johns Hopkins University) have conducted a number of 
studies examining GA accident causation.
Alaskan Aviation
It is of note that many of these efforts have focused on 
Alaska, where aviation is the primary mode of transpor-
tation. It has been said that people in Alaska fly private 
aircraft like those in the lower 48 take taxis. As can be 
seen in Figure 1, when taking into account the size of 
the state, it is no wonder that air travel is a must. In fact, 
some parts of Alaska are only accessible by air. 
Alaska is known for its varied and often unique land-
scape, including but not limited to, seemingly endless 
mountain ranges, glaciers, lakes, long coastlines, vol-
canoes, and fjords. When this veritable obstacle course 
is considered, along with temperamental weather and 
seasonal lighting conditions, even the most experienced 
pilot would have to agree that Alaskan aviation represents 
some of the most difficult flying in the U.S., if not the 
world. The combination of factors mentioned above, the 
number of GA accidents that are occurring in Alaska, 
and the FAA’s accident reduction goal (FAA Flight Plan 
2004-2008) were factors in our decision to implement 
this study.
Human Error and General Aviation
A variety of studies have been conducted in an attempt 
to understand the causes of GA accidents. Most have 
focused on contextual factors or pilot demographics, 
rather than the underlying causes of the accidents. Past 
research has shown factors like weather [e.g., Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions (IMC) versus Visual Meteo-
rological Conditions (VMC)], lighting (e.g., day versus 
night), and terrain (e.g., mountainous versus featureless) 
play a part in these accidents; however, pilots have little 
control over them. Other studies have found that a pilot’s 
gender, age, occupation, or flight experience contribute 
to the accidents (Baker, Lamb, Grabowski, Rebok, & 
Li, 2001; Li, Baker, Grabowski, & Rebok, 2001; Urban, 
Figure 1. Relative size of Alaska to the 
continental United States. (Taken from a 
briefing from the FAA Alaska Region.) 
21984) and aid in the identification of target populations 
for the dissemination of safety information.
However, when the leading cause of accidents, human 
error, has been addressed, it is often only to report the 
percentage of accidents associated with aircrew error in 
general or to identify those in which alcohol or drug use 
occurred. What is needed is a thorough human error 
analysis. Previous attempts to do just that have been 
met with limited success (O’Hare, Wiggins, Batt, & 
Morrison, 1994; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997). This is 
primarily because human error is influenced by a variety 
of factors that are usually not addressed by traditional 
classification schemes (Shappell & Wiegmann, 1997). 
Yet, with the development of the Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS) previously unknown 
patterns of human error in aviation accidents have been 
uncovered (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2001a). 
HFACS
Drawing upon Reason’s “Swiss-cheese” model of hu-
man error, Wiegmann and Shappell developed HFACS. 
The HFACS framework includes 19 causal categories 
within Reason’s (1990) four levels of human failure, of 
which the Unsafe Acts of Operators are most germane 
to this study (Figure 2). For a complete description of 
the HFACS framework, see Wiegmann and Shappell, 
2003.
In general, the unsafe acts of operators (in the case 
of aviation, the aircrew) can be classified as either errors 
or violations. Within HFACS, the category of errors 
was expanded to include three basic types (decision, 
skill-based, and perceptual errors) that, in simple terms, 
refer to errors of “thinking,” “doing,” and “perceiving.” 
To be more specific, decision errors represent conscious 
decisions/choices made by an individual that are carried 
out as intended but prove to be inadequate for the situa-
tion at hand. In contrast, skill-based behavior within the 
context of aviation is best described as “stick-and-rudder” 
and other basic flight skills that occur without significant 
conscious thought. As a result, these skill-based actions are 
particularly vulnerable to failures of attention, memory, 
or simply poor technique. Finally, perceptual errors occur 
when sensory input is degraded or “unusual,” as is often 
the case when flying at night, in weather, or in other 
visually impoverished conditions.
By definition, errors occur while aircrews are behav-
ing within the rules and regulations implemented by an 
organization. In contrast, violations represent the willful 
disregard for the rules and regulations that govern safe 
flight. The key word is “willful” in this definition. That 
is, the individuals knew that what they were doing was 
unauthorized but elected to continue anyway.
While there are many ways to distinguish between 
types of violations, two distinct forms have been 
identified, based on their etiology. The first, routine 
violations, tend to be habitual by nature and are often 
tolerated by the governing authority. The second type, 
exceptional violations, appear as isolated departures 
from authority and are not necessarily characteristic 
of an individual’s behavior nor are they condoned by 
management. 
PURPOSE
The present study set out to uncover the types of hu-
man error, as identified by HFACS, that contributed to 
GA accidents in Alaska and compare those results with 
the rest of the United States. Both the human error find-
ings and contextual factors are presented here to obtain 
a more complete picture.
METHODS
General aviation accident data from calendar years 
1990-2002 were obtained from databases maintained by 
the National Transportation Safety Board and the FAA’s 
National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center (NAS-
DAC). In total, 24,978 GA accidents were extracted for 
analysis. These so-called “GA” accidents actually included 
a variety of aircraft being flown under several different 
operating rules: 1) 14 CFR Part 91 – Civil aircraft other 
than moored balloons, kites, unmanned rockets, and 
unmanned free balloons; 2) 14 CFR Part 91F – Large 
and turbine-powered multiengine airplanes; 3) 14 CFR 
Part 103 – Ultralight vehicles; 4) 14 CFR Part 125 – Air-
planes with seating capacity of 20 or more passengers or a 
maximum payload capacity of 6,000 pounds or more; 5) 
14 CFR Part 133 – Rotorcraft external-load operations; 
6) 14 CFR Part 137 – Agricultural aircraft operations. 
In addition, the database contained several accidents 
involving public use aircraft (i.e., law enforcement, state 
owned aircraft, etc.) and a few midair accidents involving 
military aircraft.
It is difficult to envision that large commercial aircraft 
being ferried from one airport to the next (operating 
under 14 CFR Part 91F) or aircraft being used to spread 
chemicals on a field (operating under 14 CFR Part 137) 
can be equated with small private aircraft being flown 
for personal or recreational purposes (operating under 
14 CFR Part 91). Therefore, we selected only 14 CFR 
Part 91 accidents for our analyses (22,987) to obtain a 
more discrete GA sample.
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Figure 2. The HFACS framework.
4This analysis was primarily concerned with powered 
aircraft and thus the data were further restricted to include 
only accidents involving powered fixed-wing aircraft, heli-
copters, and gyrocopters. The remaining 22,248 accidents 
were then examined for aircrew-related causal factors. 
Since we were only interested in those accidents involving 
aircrew error, not those that were purely mechanical in 
nature or solely attributable to other human involvement, 
a final reduction of the data was conducted. Note, this 
does not mean that mechanical failures or other sources 
of human error did not exist in the final database, only 
that some form of aircrew error was also involved in each 
of the accidents included. Figure 3 depicts the frequency 
of GA accidents associated with human error from 1990 
to 2002. In the end, 17,808 accidents were included in 
the database that were associated with some form of hu-
man error and were submitted to further analyses using 
the HFACS framework.
Causal Factor Classification Using HFACS
Six GA pilots were recruited from the Oklahoma City 
area as subject matter experts and received roughly 16 
hours of training on the HFACS framework. All seven 
were certified flight instructors with a minimum of 1,000 
flight hours in GA aircraft (mean = 3,530 flight hours) 
when the study began. 
After training, the six GA pilot-raters were randomly 
assigned accidents, so at least two separate pilot-raters 
analyzed each accident independently. Using narrative 
and tabular data obtained from both the NTSB and the 
FAA NASDAC, the pilot-raters classified each human 
causal factor using the HFACS framework. Note, however, 
that only those causal factors identified by the NTSB 
were classified. That is, the pilot-raters were instructed 
not to introduce additional casual factors that were not 
identified by the original investigation. To do so would 
be presumptuous and only infuse additional opinion, 
conjecture, and guesswork into the analysis process.
After the pilot-raters made their initial classifications 
of the NTSB causal factors using HFACS (i.e., skill-based 
error, decision-error, etc.) the two ratings were compared. 
Where differences existed between the ratings, the two 
pilots were asked to reconcile their differences and an 
agreed-upon “consensus” classification was included in 
the database for further analysis. Overall, the independent 
pilot-raters agreed on the classification of human causal 
factors within the HFACS framework more than 85% 
of the time. More important, all human causal factors 
identified in the NTSB records were accommodated 
using the HFACS framework, and the data were ulti-
mately submitted to a final quality assurance analysis 
by the authors.
RESULTS
When using HFACS to examine the GA accident 
data, the majority of the accidents are coded with either 
a precondition for unsafe acts or an unsafe act. This is 
due primarily to the fact that there is less of an organi-
zational or supervisory influence on the majority of GA 
pilots, as compared with their counterparts conducting 
commercial or “for hire” operations. 
Indeed, with few exceptions (e.g., flight instructors 
and flight training institutions), the top two tiers of 
HFACS (unsafe supervision and organizational influ-
ences) remained sparsely populated when examining 
the GA accidents, leaving the majority of causal factors 
within the bottom two tiers of HFACS. Consequently, 
the balance of this report will focus only on the unsafe 
acts of the operator level of the HFACS framework.
Unsafe Acts of Operators (Aircrew)
An overall review of the GA accident data yielded 
the following results (see Figure 4). The most prevalent 
error noted in the accident data over the past decade 
was skill-based errors (73%), followed by decision errors 
(28%), violations (13%), and perceptual errors (7%). 
The relatively flat lines in the types of unsafe acts across 
the years suggest that past intervention strategies have 
had little differential impact on any particular category 
of error. 
To obtain a better sense of how human error differences 
between Alaska and the rest of the United States (RoUS) 
are represented in the data, the error types were broken 
out accordingly (Figure 5). The analysis of the unsafe 
acts revealed that there were slightly more decision errors, 
fewer skill-based errors, perceptual errors, and violations 
in Alaska than there were in the RoUS. 
Note, the following analyses did not distinguish be-
tween those pilots who were native to Alaska and were 
involved in an accident versus those who were less familiar 
with the state. Accordingly, the statistics for Alaska reflect 
the accidents that occurred within the physical boundar-
ies of the state. 
Skill-Based Errors. Differences that existed between 
Alaska and the RoUS were fairly consistent across the 
years of study, with slightly more skill-based errors as-
sociated with accidents in the RoUS (see Figure 6). The 
only exception involved 1991, 1996, and again in 2002, 
where the percentages were nearly equal. 
Differences between Alaska and the RoUS were more 
distinct when the actual types of skill-based error were 
compared (Table 1). For instance, directional control 
was the most frequently cited skill-based error for both 
Alaska (19%) and for the rest of the U.S. (13%). Pilots in 
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Alaska versus the rest of the U.S.  
Table 1. Top 5 Skill-based errors occurring for 
Alaska and the rest of the U.S.
Alaska N (%) RoUS N (%) 
Directional 
Control 206 (18.6%) 
Directional 
Control 2139 (12.6%) 
Compensation 
for Wind 
Conditions 
170 (15.4%)  Airspeed 1932 (11.3%) 
Stall   88 (8.0%) Stall 1312 (7.7%) 
Airspeed   76 (6.9%) Aircraft Control 1310 (7.7%) 
Ground 
Loop/Swerve   50 (4.5%) 
Compensation 
for Wind 
Conditions 
1009 (5.9%) 
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6Alaska were more likely to experience a loss of directional 
control of their aircraft than those in the rest of the U.S. 
(odds ratio = 1.593, Χ2 = 33.400, p <.001). Addition-
ally, inadequate compensation for wind conditions was 
almost three times more likely to occur in Alaska (odds 
ratio = 2.884, Χ2 = 150.893, p <.001). Conversely, pilots 
in the rest of the U.S. were almost two times more likely 
to commit airspeed errors than those in Alaska (odds ratio 
= 1.733, Χ2 = 20.652, p <.001). 
Decision Errors. To better understand the complexity 
of the decision errors that were occurring in the accidents 
for both Alaska and the rest of the U.S., a fine-grained 
analysis of the data was conducted. Figure 7 illustrates 
the decision error trends for Alaska and the rest of the 
U.S. across the 13-year period from 1990-2002. With 
the exception of 1990, 1991, and 2002, any difference 
that did exist was remarkably consistent across years of 
the study.
Upon closer examination, the largest proportion of 
decision errors in the rest of the U.S. involved in-flight 
planning/decision making, accounting for 19% of those 
observed. However, the top decision error for pilots fly-
ing in Alaska dealt with decisions to utilize unimproved 
landing, takeoff, taxi areas, or unsuitable terrain. As a 
matter of fact, those flying in Alaska were almost 15 
times more likely to take off from and land on unsuitable 
terrain than those in the rest of the U.S. (odds ratio = 
14.703, Χ2 = 829.461, p <.001). A break-out of the top 
five decision errors for Alaska and the rest of the U.S. are 
presented in Table 2. 
Perceptual Errors. Generally associated with less than 
10% of the accidents, perceptual errors in Alaska occurred 
with a similar frequency as those in the rest of the U.S. 
(see Figure 8). Moreover, there were few, if any, reliable 
differences between Alaska and the RoUS when the type 
of perceptual error was examined (Table 3). Indeed, given 
the very small cell size for specific types of perceptual 
errors occurring in Alaska, it was difficult to draw any 
defensible conclusions.
Violations. In general, violations were associated with 
less than 20% of GA accidents (Figure 9). For the entire 
U.S. population, nearly 50% of these accidents resulted 
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Figure 7. Decision errors broken out by 
Alaska versus the rest of the U.S. 
Table 3. Top 5 Perceptual errors occurring for 
Alaska and the rest of the U.S.
Alaska N (%) RoUS N (%) 
Flare 12 (21.1%) Flare  246 (20.1%) 
Aircraft Control  6 (10.5%) Aircraft Control  201 (16.4%) 
Altitude  5 (8.8%) Altitude  121 (9.9%) 
Clearance  5 (8.8%) Distance/ Speed    98 (8.0%) 
Proper 
Touchdown 
Point 
 5 (8.8%) Distance/ Altitude    87 (7.1) Figure 8. Perceptual errors broken out by Alaska 
versus the rest of the U.S.
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Table 2. Top 5 Decision errors occurring for 
Alaska and the rest of the U.S. 
Alaska N (%) RoUS N (%) 
Unsuitable 
Terrain 193 (40.5%) 
In-flight 
Planning/ 
Decision 
1002 (18.7%) 
In-flight 
Planning/ 
Decision 
  59 (12.4) Planning/ Decision   374 (7.0%) 
Aborted 
Takeoff   28 (5.9%) Refueling   351 (6.5%) 
Planning/ 
Decision   19 (4.0%) 
Remedial 
Action   339 (6.3%) 
Go-around   18 (3.8%) Go-around   336 (6.3%) 
7in a fatality. When examining accidents in Alaska sepa-
rately from the rest of the U.S., differences were found. 
Accidents involving violations in Alaska were nine times 
more likely to result in a fatality (odds ratio = 9.248, Χ2 
= 127.606, p <.001); whereas those that occurred in the 
rest of the U.S. were four times more likely to result in a 
fatality, (odds ratio = 4.410, Χ2 = 1054.059, p <.001).
A closer look at the types of violations revealed that 
the most frequently cited violation for all GA accidents 
was Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight into Instrument 
Meteorological Conditions (IMC), (Table 4). VFR flight 
into IMC, alone, accounted for one-third of the viola-
tions in the Alaska data and was more than two and a 
half times more likely to occur than in the rest of the U.S. 
(odds ratio = 2.629, Χ2 = 22.467, p <.001). Furthermore, 
when the weather-related violations were combined (VFR 
into IMC, flight into known adverse weather, and flight 
into adverse weather), nearly half of the violations in the 
Alaska data were represented. 
Contextual Data
Phase of Flight. The majority of GA accidents for Alaska 
and the rest of the U.S. occurred during the landing and 
takeoff phases of flight (see Figure 10). Note, however, 
that the accidents in Alaska had a higher occurrence in 
both of those phases than those in the rest of the U.S., 
where cruise and approach were higher. Additionally, when 
takeoff and climb are compared against descent, approach, 
and landing, across the board, comparatively more ac-
cidents occurred during the latter phases of flight.
Fatal vs. Non-Fatal and Injury Level. Curiously, acci-
dents occurring in the RoUS were more likely to include 
a fatality (23%) than those in Alaska (10%, see Figure 
11). Specifically, the accidents in the RoUS were 2.8 times 
more likely to result in a fatality (odds ratio =2.808, Χ2 
= 125.090, p <.001). This pattern held across all levels 
of injury severity (Figure 12) as roughly three-fourths 
of the GA accidents occurring in Alaska involved no 
injuries at all. 
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Figure 9. Violations broken out by Alaska 
versus the rest of the U.S. 
Table 4. Top 5 Violations occurring for Alaska and 
the rest of the U.S. 
Alaska N (%) RoUS N (%) 
VFR Into IMC   38 (32.5%) VFR Into IMC 369 (15.5%) 
Aircraft Weight 
& Balance   13 (11.1%) 
Operation with 
Known 
Deficiencies 
261 (10.9%) 
Procedures/ 
Directives   12 (10.3%) 
Procedures/ 
Directives 248 (10.4%) 
Flight Into 
Known Adverse 
Weather 
  11 (9.4%) 
Flight Into 
Known 
Adverse 
Weather 
212 (8.9%) 
Operation With 
Known 
Deficiencies 
  8 (6.8%) Aircraft Weight & Balance  149 (6.2%) 
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Figure 11. Percentage of fatal versus non-fatal 
accidents in Alaska and the rest of the U.S. 
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Figure 10. Percentage of accidents occurring in each 
phase of flight for Alaska and the rest of the U.S.
8Weather and Lighting Conditions. Very few differences 
between Alaska and the rest of the U.S. were noted with 
regard to either lighting conditions (day, twilight, and 
night) or weather (IMC vs. VMC). That is, the vast 
majority of accidents occurred during the daytime and 
in VMC conditions (Figures 13 & 14). However, when 
the two conditions were combined to create a measure 
of visibility (i.e., clear versus impoverished condition), 
some small but significant differences emerged (Figure 
15). Specifically, accidents were more likely to occur in 
visually impoverished (at night/twilight or IMC) condi-
tions in the rest of the U.S. than in Alaska (odds ratio 
=2.160, Χ2 = 68.766, p <.001).
DISCUSSION
On the surface, there were no major differences between 
Alaska and the rest of the U.S. with regard to the overall 
pattern of human error. If anything, there were slightly 
more decision errors associated with accidents occurring 
in Alaska and fewer skill-based errors, perceptual errors, 
and violations. This information is similar to research in 
other aviation operations, which identified skill-based 
errors as the most commonly occurring type of error 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003; Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001b; 2003). 
Upon closer examination, both Alaska and the rest 
of the U.S. exhibited similar problems with regards to 
the specific types of each HFACS causal category. When 
addressing skill-based errors, the accident data suggest 
that aircraft handling should be taken into account when 
determining where interventions should be applied. For 
instance, any training (both ab initio and recurrent) 
along these lines should include control of the aircraft 
on the ground (e.g., ground loops), crosswind landings, 
avoiding and recovering from stalls, and general control 
of the aircraft in flight. Given the inherent risk associated 
with some of these maneuvers, it makes sense to utilize 
modern simulators during this training. Unfortunately, it 
is unclear whether adequate transfer of training warrants 
this possibility. Therefore, before utilizing simulations to 
address these issues, research needs to be conducted to 
examine the role simulators might offer. In the meantime 
however, it appears to make sense to emphasize these 
topics during actual in-flight training. 
The only notable exception among the HFACS casual 
categories involved decision errors. Specifically, pilots in 
Alaska were more likely to utilize unsuitable terrain for 
landing, taxi, and takeoff. It would appear that educat-
ing aviators on the hazards of utilizing frozen rivers or 
gravel bars, for example, may reduce these types of errors. 
However, it may be that there are simply more “improved” 
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Figure 12. Percentage of accidents associated 
with the four levels of injury. 
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occurring in Alaska and the rest of the U.S. 
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accidents in Alaska and the rest of the U.S. 
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of the U.S. 
9areas in the rest of the United States, providing pilots 
with more options in case of an emergency (i.e., alternate 
airports, highways, roads, etc.), in which case education 
in and of itself may not prove successful. Additionally, 
it is worth noting that “unsuitable terrain” was defined 
by the NTSB investigators after the fact; the moment to 
moment judgment of how suitable terrain may be during 
a flight may be influenced by factors not considered fully 
in post hoc analyses. 
Also of concern in both Alaska and the rest of the 
U.S. was in-flight planning/decision making. After all, 
decisions made during flight are often more critical than 
those occurring on the ground. Thus, when confronted 
with important decisions in-flight, pilots are often under 
pressure to be right the first time with limited infor-
mation. Scenario-based training along these lines as 
provided within the FAA-Industry Training Standards 
(FITS) program may improve decision-making in the 
cockpit, particularly if examples are drawn from the 
accident record. 
Of the unsafe acts that aircrew commit, addressing 
violations may be the most difficult and complex. Recall 
that violations are the “willful” disregard for the rules 
and, as such, are not necessarily something that can be 
easily deterred or mitigated. Nevertheless, since nearly 
half of violations involved fatalities, such behaviors as 
VFR flight into IMC are of great concern to the FAA 
and other aviation safety professionals. 
Even though the percentage of accidents associated 
with violations did not differ markedly between Alaska 
and the rest of the U.S., the specific types of violations did 
differ in meaningful ways. In particular, when intentional 
VFR flight into IMC and other adverse weather condi-
tions were combined, an alarming 47% of the violations 
occurring in Alaska were accounted for (27% for the rest 
of the U.S.). Exactly why a larger proportion was observed 
in Alaska remains unknown, but one reason may be the 
rapid climatic changes that often occur, especially around 
mountainous areas.
So why would a VFR-only pilot fly into such hazard-
ous conditions? This has perplexed safety professionals 
and aviation psychologists alike. At least one study sug-
gests that pilots' overconfidence in their personal ability 
and need for goal achievement (too much was already 
invested in the trip to turn around or deviate from course) 
may explain this behavior (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002). 
Other research proposed certain factors that influence 
the pilot’s decision to press into the weather, specifically 
in Alaska, could be due to the lack of relevant informa-
tion, ambiguous cues, time pressure, and risk perception, 
among others (Holbrook, Orasanu, & McCoy, 2003). 
Batt and O’Hare (2005) have proposed that the decision 
to fly into degraded conditions could depend on the stage 
of flight. They hypothesize that in the early part of the 
flight, pilots will weigh the alternatives of continuing the 
flight or turning around. Later in flight, pilots debate on 
whether to perform a precautionary landing (consider-
ing the loss and potential damage that can result) or to 
continue into weather and hope conditions improve, 
avoiding the potential loss. Regardless of the reasons, 
it is imperative that pilots be adequately informed and 
trained on the real dangers that they encounter when 
they continue or attempt VFR flight into hazardous 
weather conditions.
Current interventions, like weather cameras in moun-
tain passes and other locations, have proved useful by 
providing pilots with access to real-time weather infor-
mation and therefore allowing them to make informed 
decisions. In addition, the Medallion Foundation has 
provided GA pilots training using high-resolution flight 
simulators capable of producing simulated weather and 
lighting conditions over the Alaskan terrain. With this 
technology, pilots are able to safely navigate through 
Alaska and see what flying through places such as Merrill 
Pass in adverse weather conditions could entail, a difficult 
task even for a highly experienced pilot to successfully 
perform in clear conditions.
Alaska, as perhaps the FAA’s largest aviation laboratory, 
has been the testbed for advanced avionics like those as-
sociated with the Capstone project. Enhanced weather 
radar, global positioning sensors, Automated Dependent 
Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B), and other cutting-edge 
technologies provide a more accurate picture of how the 
weather, terrain, and traffic situations actually look from 
inside the cockpit. These technologies have proven useful 
with 14 CFR Part 135 (commuter) operations (Williams, 
Yost, Holland, & Tyler, 2002). However, their efficacy 
within GA remains to be seen. 
Although technology has led to a reduction in aviation 
accidents in Alaska, we cannot rely solely on it as the 
panacea for GA safety. Being a successful pilot requires 
basic “stick and rudder” skills. These are particularly 
important during the critical phases of flight (i.e., takeoff 
and landing). Similar to previous reports (AOPA, 2005), 
we found the largest percentage of accidents occurred 
during takeoff and landing. A larger proportion of these 
accidents occurred in Alaska than in the rest of the U.S. 
This is consistent with the observation that in Alaska deci-
sions concerning takeoff and landing from unimproved 
terrain account for a significant proportion of accidents. 
Importantly, unlike violations, these types of decision 
errors typically have not resulted in fatalities (Wiegmann 
et al., 2005). However, this does not mean that they did 
not involve significant damage to the aircraft or have a 
significant economic impact. 
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CONCLUSIONS
In recent years, a growing concern has been directed 
toward GA accident rates. Indeed the FAA Administrator 
has set a goal of a 20% reduction in GA accidents by fis-
cal year 2008. If this goal is to be realized, interventions 
that target the underlying human causes as identified in 
this analysis need to be developed. 
The next step in this research effort will be the develop-
ment of the Human Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX), 
which pits the unsafe acts of operators (i.e., skill-based 
errors, decision errors, perceptual errors, and violations) 
against several putative intervention approaches (e.g., 
organizational, human-centered, technology, task, and 
environment; Figure 16). In addition, other features will 
be integrated into the model/matrix such as feasibility, 
efficacy, and acceptance. 
Once developed, HFIX will be validated and assessed 
using intervention programs currently in use and planned 
within the Small Airplane Directorate (ACE-100), the 
General Aviation & Commercial Division (AFS-800), 
Alaska Region (AAL), and other FAA offices.
Ultimately, the systematic application of HFACS, 
coupled with the methodical utilization of HFIX (once 
fully developed) to generate intervention solutions, should 
ensure that the aviation industry’s personnel and monetary 
resources are utilized wisely. This should occur because 
such efforts will be needs-based and data-driven. Together, 
these tools will allow the true effectiveness of intervention 
programs to be objectively and impartially evaluated so 
that they can be either modified or reinforced to improve 
system performance. Only then can any great strides in 
improving the GA accident rate be achieved.
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